UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/70
31 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF TUVALU FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 4093rd meeting on 28 January 2000, the Security Council had before it the application of Tuvalu (S/2000/5) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 102nd and 103rd meeting on 28 and 31 January 2000, the Committee considered the application of Tuvalu and decided to recommend to the Security Council that Tuvalu should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of Tuvalu for admission to the United Nations (S/2000/5),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Tuvalu be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

5. The representative of China stated that China was unable to associate itself with the recommendation of the Committee for the admission of Tuvalu to membership in the United Nations and that it would expound its position at the formal meeting of the Security Council.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/54/731
S/2000/71
31 January 2000

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 43
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 31 January 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith an urgent letter, addressed to you by Salim El Hoss, President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon (see annex).

In view of the gravity of the situation, I should be grateful if you would give the issue described in the letter your most urgent attention so as to prevent the occupying Israeli forces from further persisting with their illegitimate plans of redrawing the frontiers in the south of Lebanon in a manner that violates the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon.

I further have the honour to request that the enclosed letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Selim TADMOURY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 31 January 2000 from the Prime Minister of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to call your attention to the gravity of the new situation emerging in the area of Lebanon's southern borders with Israel. Since the Barak Government announced its wish to withdraw from Lebanon, it has ordered the Israeli army to engage in actions that may result in Lebanon's southern boundaries being redrawn.

Israel's actions are in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. They constitute a shameful attack on Lebanon's sovereignty and on its internationally recognized borders and are manifestly contrary to the requirements of a just and comprehensive peace in the region.

I request you to take the measures authorized under the Charter in order to deter Israel from persisting in its infringements of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to draw the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous character of Israeli practices and to have this letter circulated as a United Nations document.

(Signed) Salim EL-HOSS
Prime Minister

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/72
1 February 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of the members of the Council, a report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 28 January 2000.

(Signed) A. Peter VAN WALSUM
Chairman
Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

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Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 (S/22660, annex) approved by the Security Council in its resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991.

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the thirty-fifth of its kind submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines.

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review, the Committee has received no such information.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, that is, items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period covered by the report, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, including providing to the Committee any relevant information that may have come to their attention. During the period under review, no such information has been brought to the attention of the Committee.

6. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991 (S/22884/Add.2), no further communications have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

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GENERAL

S/2000/73
31 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to forward to you a document on conflicts in the Great Lakes region by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda (see annex).

In view of the importance of the current debate on African issues in the Security Council this month, the document provides the necessary background to some of the root causes of the conflicts in the region. My Government requests that the document be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) SEMAKULA KIWANUKA
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Uganda
to the United Nations

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Annex

Conflicts in the Great Lakes region

by

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,
President of the Republic of Uganda

(24 January 2000)

The Great Lakes region's crisis most prominent features have been:

(i) Genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo;

(ii) Mass murders in Uganda (800,000 people were killed extrajudicially during the time of Amin and Obote);

(iii) Terrorism sponsored by the so-called Islamic regime of the Sudan with some collaboration from Afghanistan and some elements in Pakistan;

(iv) The absence of democratic governance for very long periods plus lack of proper state structures to guarantee this democracy.

General background:

The above manifestations of the Great Lakes region's problems are against the general background of the socio-economic, as well as political distortions, at the sunset of colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. Maybe, let me start with these socio-economic and political distortions that characterized sub-Saharan Africa at the close of the colonial era. Although I have described the social-economic structure of the Ugandan society (as an example), at the dawn of colonialism, in 1860, elsewhere, I do not mind repeating it for the purposes of this debate. Many of the tribes in Uganda and the neighbouring territories of Eastern Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and North Western Tanzania had, by that time, become three-class societies comprising: the feudal class; the artisan class (blacksmiths, carpenters, potters, leather-workers, etc.); and the peasants (cultivators and cattle-keepers). Therefore, the African societies of our area were only one step away from, endogenously, entering the industrial phase of social metamorphosis. Without the negative exogenous interruption by colonialism, the artisan class would have evolved into the middle and working classes. With the onset of colonialism, however, our area suffered a massive social regression. The feudal class was eliminated because it was competing for political authority with colonialism; and the artisan class was greatly undermined by the massive, enforced imports of consumer and capital goods from Europe (hoes, pangas, ceramics, textiles, leather goods, etc.). Certainly in the case of Uganda, society became a one-class society thereafter - the peasantry. The colonial system developed a thin layer of colonial auxiliaries in the form of: sub-administrators, clerks, low-level teachers, non-commissioner officers and privates in the colonial Armies, interpreters, etc., from among the locals. They were, however, divorced from production of wealth and had no multiplier effect on the rest of society except, as I will point out later, in the post-colonial period.

This phenomenon of social regression, therefore, meant that, while the European society was metamorphosing from a feudal mode of production to an industrial bourgeois one, Africa was retreating from the feudal level to the pre-feudal. The failure to develop a bourgeois class, which is cosmopolitan-minded by virtue of its mode of production, has got implications for politics and the economy. The peasant class that came to be dominant in society is by nature parochial, unlike the middle class. Somebody who is looking after only goats does not need the whole of Uganda to do so. He is, therefore, mainly worried about the hills around him and the valleys that contain water so as to

feed and water his goats. Yes, some cash crops (coffee, cocoa and cotton) were exploited semi-commercially. These, however, had no internal linkages with the national economy and society. The peasants' cash crops were to feed European industries. This absence of internal economic linkages could not foster a national consciousness; and the national consciousness that the feudal classes had fostered was also being undermined. Where the minerals existed, they were also exploited in a manner that did not link them with the national economy other than providing the labour force. The predominance of a parochial ideology, concomitant to the domination of society by the peasantry, accentuated by the colonial schemes of divide and rule in order to forestall any possible anti-colonial rebellions, form an important background to all the problems of the Great Lakes region.

Owing to the worldwide anti-colonial movement (in India, China, Indo-China, Kenya, etc.), and also owing to the two inter-imperialist wars of the last century (1900s), it became impossible for the colonial Powers to maintain servitude over the colonized peoples. The colonialists that were far-sighted gave "independence" to the former colonies. Harold Macmillan of UK spoke of the unstoppable "wind of change" that was blowing across Africa in his Cape Town speech of 1960. Who, then, received this "independence"? It was, mainly, the former colonial auxiliaries (the colonial schoolteachers, the clerks, the colonial sergeants, etc.). Therefore, "independence" meant the continuation of the colonial state after decapitating it by removing its European brains and leaving the auxiliary body of low African colonial servants, many of whom were not prepared for such roles. That is how sergeant Idi Amin of the 4th Kings' African Rifles (KAR) (a British colonial outfit) became "Field marshal" Amin. This is the monster that killed 500,000 Ugandans. He was assisted by Obote who murdered 300,000 other Ugandans. Obote had been a trade union official for a little while and, later on, was in the colonial "Parliament" that had been hastily organized around 1958 (just four years before "independence").

This was an unfortunate cocktail. A society that had regressed to the pre-feudal era being presided over by colonial auxiliaries that had been hastily cast in the mode of freedom fighters, statesmen or field marshals. The society was excessively parochial and the latter were hopelessly out of their depth so that they could not diagnose the sickness of this society. These two phenomena form an important background in understanding the trauma of this region. You could erase the name of "Field Marshal" Idi Amin and you insert the name of "Field marshal" Mobutu Ssesse Sseko, Bokasa, Michombero, etc., etc.

On top of this general background, now add the mismanagement of Rwanda and Burundi by the Belgian colonial authorities. I have, in recent times, met very nice Belgian people. The Belgian colonial polices, however, were a very dangerous addition to the unfortunate background I have just outlined. While all the colonial countries used the tactics of divide and rule, the Belgian officials in charge of Rwanda went one dangerous step further: to incite and assist one of the sections of the Rwanda society to try and exterminate the other part. This happened in 1959. I normally hear outside commentators talking about the "ethnic" conflicts of Rwanda and Burundi. I would like to ask one question: Did these "ethnic" groups of Rwanda and Burundi only come into existence after the onset of Belgian colonialism? The answer is obviously, no.

Why do we, then, not hear of earlier "ethnic" conflicts in these countries? Why don't we hear of genocide before the colonial era?

I do not want to talk of the detailed situations of Rwanda and Burundi because there are those more competent to speak about those countries. I can, however, authoritatively speak about Uganda. Almost the whole of Western Uganda had comparable social formations just like the ones of Rwanda, Burundi, some parts of Eastern Congo and North Western Tanzania.

In order to do justice to this highly muddled up situation, I will integrate my earlier contribution on this subject with this presentation. Some months ago I gave a speech in Arusha on the issue of Burundi which I would like to reproduce here because it is important that the international community understands our highly complicated area which some intruders have really messed up. That speech went roughly as follows:

The Pre-Colonial Conflicts:

At the beginning of A.D. 1500, conflicts in Central Africa were characterized, in the main, by tribal raids for cattle and women rather than by wars of conquest. There were some efforts of Empire-building in the Great Lakes areas (the Bacwezi-Batembuzi-Babito kingdoms). The durability of such political entities was, however, compromised by poor mobility of the centralized authorities because of lack of the horse on account of tsetse flies, and small populations due to the diseases that thrived in the tropics. Small populations meant that there was no pressure on natural resources. Ours, until recently, was characterized by plentiful natural resources around small populations. There was, therefore, no need for one tribe to conquer another tribe and control it. The tribes did not have the reasons or the ability to engage in sustained expansionism in order to form large supranational states compared to the Russian or Chinese empires, for instance. In spite of the tribes being homogeneous culturally, they were not governed under unified kingdoms.

With small populations and poor mobility, the ability to sustain large-scale political units was impaired. Hence, many of the conflicts were raids for cattle, women and even slaves (abahuuku) and maids (abazaana). The raid by Ntare V of Ankole in around 1894 into Rwanda and the counter-raid by Kigeri IV, Rwabugiri, of Rwanda into Ankole in the same year fell into this category. The raid by Bachwa, son of Mutambuka, into Makara (Congo) in around 1860, again, falls into this category. In that raid, for instance, a young girl known as Kibooga was captured as a maid (a muzaana). Since she was beautiful, she was eventually, married by Mutambuka, the King of Ankole. She produced Ntare V, Rugingiza, who became the King of Ankole until his death in 1895.

In some areas of Central Africa, we also had wars of succession. In this respect, I can quote again the wars between Ntare and his half-brothers, Mukwenda and Muhikira and the one between Kabalega and Kabigumiire of Bunyoro in the year 1871. At this point, I would like to quote the exemplary case of Buganda where succession wars were banished after the one between Jjunju and Semakokiro in 1771. The Baganda clan leaders, 52 of them, decided that, thereafter, the upbringing of the Princes would no longer be the responsibility of the Kabaka (the King) or of their mothers. It would, instead, be the

responsibility of a designated state official, Kasujju of the Ngeye clan. He would be the mukuza (guardian) of all the princes. In order to ensure that none of the princes would be a rallying point for faction formation, all princes were confined by Kasujju in the amphitheatre (olunnya) in Katereke in Mpigi. Everything they needed was provided for them there. However, the princes paid for this through isolation from all the members of the public, including their mothers. They would only deal with Kasujju, their wives and pages.

When the Kabaka died, he would not indicate a successor. He would depart in peace. Then the Council of Clan Leaders would meet and they would ask Kasujju to "present his children" - the Princes (okwanjula abaana be). Kasujju would go through the qualities of the Princes: This one is "kind"; that one is "cruel" (mukambwe); the other one is lazy (munafu) etc. The clans' council would, then, make a decision by voting. The day after, the public would be assembled and the job of announcing the king would be done by another state official, Mugema of the Nkima clan. Mugema, however, would have to invoke the authority of God (Lubaale) in order to have the nominee of the Clan's Council accepted by the public. To the public it had to appear that the king had been nominated by Lubaale (God) and not merely by the Clan's Council, reverence to the Clan's Council notwithstanding.

Hence, all the princes would be lined up in full view of the public. Mugema would, then, move up and down the line waiting for Lubaale (God) to indicate to him which of the princes was suitable to be king. After several laps of moving up and down, Lubaale would guide Mugema to the Prince that had been agreed upon by the Clan's Council the previous day. Such Lubaale-guided king-hunts were not without their drama and tragedies. It is said that when Kabaka Suuna died in 1854, the clan leaders' council, as the tradition had been established, conclaved to elect a new king. During the conclave of the previous day, they had agreed on a certain name. Some of the clan leaders departed. Those who remained, however, developed second thoughts about the name they had agreed on and, instead they settled on Mukaabya, Mutesa I. They must have been the majority.

When Mugema, therefore, guided by Lubaale, settled on the later nominee, Mutesa I, the ones who had departed early the previous day protested loudly that it was the other one and not Mutesa. Mugema ignored the protests and went ahead with the enthronement; but Mutesa had noted those chiefs that had protested. Once on the throne, he ensured that they were all put to death; hence, the name of Mukaabya (one who makes people weep).

Therefore, in the Great Lakes area, we have both examples of untamed succession wars as in the case of Ankole, Bunyoro and Rwanda by the 1800s; and a completely disciplined succession mechanism as in the case of Buganda. It is, therefore, important for us to note that the Baganda had successfully banished wars of succession from their system, ever since the 1771 war between Semakokiro and Jjunju. Succession wars were reintroduced by the British in late 1880s by disrupting this succession mechanism in an attempt to have monarchs loyal to them as many of the princes were repelled by the idea of a quisling King, subservient to foreign interests.

The other source of conflict was due to population migrations. Around 1500 and after, there were conflicts when the Luo peoples were moving into Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania from Southern Sudan. These, however, died down and the newcomers were either assimilated or they became good neighbours.

Contacts with the outside world:

The most destructive conflicts were those caused by the slave trade. Even slave trading empires or spheres of influence grew out of European guns fuelling conquest in order to get slaves. We have the examples of Lunda-Luba Empire and of the exploits of Tipu Tipu in Katanga. In terms of human haemorrhage, this was most destructive. René Dumont, in his False Start in Africa, estimates that as many as 50 million Africans perished in slavery.

Therefore, of all the pre-colonial African conflicts, the most destructive were the slave wars. The others were occasional and short-lived disturbances. Even the Shaka and Ngoni wars seem to have been sparked off by the arrival of the Whites at the Cape. The Zulu clans, which had hitherto not been centralized, woke up to the need of centralization in order to confront the Whites who started colonizing the Cape in 1652. As is well known, there was an upsurge of migration and conflict sparked off by these efforts of building a Centralized State out of a fraternity of independent kin clans of the Xhosa - Zulu-speaking peoples of southern Africa.

I, therefore, reiterate that the African conflicts of the pre-colonial times were rather benign and short-lived. In most of them, there was no record of genocide. It was mainly to capture cattle and women. Women were not killed but married. As far as the men were concerned, it would, probably, be the conquered chiefs that would be killed but not the ordinary people. Mutambuka caused the killing of the King of Karagwe, possibly Ndagara; but there was no killing of any significant number of Banyambo. Mutambuka, again, caused the killing of Ishansa of Kooki; but there was no significant number of ordinary Bakooki killed. Therefore, these purely African pre-colonial conflicts were short-lived raids, punitive expeditions or succession wars with either economic (cattle raids) or political (succession wars) motives.

What, then, characterizes colonial-fuelled African conflicts? We have seen that before the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference, two types of wars were engineered among Africans by the imperialists: The slave trade wars and the Ngoni wars which, I think, were precipitated by the arrival of the colonialists at the Cape as I pointed out above. Then there were the wars of resistance against colonialism after the Berlin Conference. In a period of almost 400 years (from 1498 to 1880), the European invaders slowly nibbled at the independence of Africa from their coastal trading and slaving stations: Zanzibar, Sofala, Mombasa, Luanda, Lagos, Cotonou, Gorée Island, etc. In 1498, when Vasco Da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, the Europeans did not have the strength to conquer the continent: No steam engine; no breech-loaders but muzzle loaders; and no automatic rifles; no quinine, etc. They therefore, stayed at the coast and relied on Black-on-Black wars to get what they needed: slaves, ivory, gold, etc.

By 1880, they had, through technological improvement, overcome their constraints. As the invaders were resolving their constraints, the Africans, through the greed of the African chiefs, were engaged in fratricidal conflicts on behalf of the foreign slavers. As an example, the kingdom of the Bakongo had been destroyed. Some of the successor kingdoms were to implement the slave trade and not to stop it. In spite of the improved technology of the whites and in spite of the myopia and greed of the African chiefs, many African peoples put up resistance: The Hehe, the Kalenjin, the Banyoro, the Shona, the Ndebele, the Somalis, the Herero, the Zulus, the Ashanti, etc. Since the African continent was divided politically, this resistance was piecemeal and was defeated one by one. The Ethiopians, however, defeated the Italians, completely, in 1896.

Wars of National Liberation:

One other type of conflict was the Wars of national Liberation. While much of the decolonization in Africa was peaceful, many of the colonial powers, having drawn appropriate lessons from the anti-colonial wars in China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, the massive independence movement in India, Kenya and Algeria, gave independence to their colonial possessions; a few were, however, foolish enough to ignore this "Wind of Change". Among the few were the Portuguese, the Settler Regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the racist Whites in South Africa and Namibia. These wars were legitimate and cleansing. They had solidarity from the whole of progressive Africa and from the Socialist camp. They resulted in the independence of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, Namibia and majority rule in South Africa. They were laudable, principled and necessary; and they propelled Africa to a higher level of freedom.

Colonial Manipulation:

To go back to the colonization of Africa, we should point out that after conquest, the Europeans had to rely on manipulation: divide and rule in order to maintain their control. In Uganda they pitted Baganda against other Ugandans; Catholics versus Protestants; Christians against Moslems; Nilotics against Bantu, etc. In Rwanda and Burundi they promoted Hutu-Tutsi conflict; in Angola suspicion between the Mbundus and Ovimbundu; in Mozambique suspicions between Makua and others or trying to isolate the Makonde, etc.

These rivalries have resulted in open conflicts in many areas: Biafra versus Nigeria; Angola; violence in Kwazulu; violence in Matebele land; succession wars, religious wars and in more recent times, after colonialism, civil wars as far as Uganda is concerned; the conflict in Angola; the conflicts and genocide in Rwanda; the conflicts and genocide in Burundi, etc. The primary interest these rivalries, conflicts or genocide serve is colonial interest. The ways the conflicts are executed are completely at variance with the African traditions of the known past. As I told you above, genocide is completely un-African. Yet we have witnessed several phenomena of this ugly practice. They invented a completely obscurantist ideology in, for instance, the Great Lakes region. Some of the highly integrated, specialized and civilized societies of the Great Lakes region are now the epitome of disaster and disintegration thanks to this obscurantism. We have now witnessed incredible bloodletting in Rwanda and Burundi because of "ethnic" differences. What are these ethnic groups and how are they different from each other?

The Social Structure in the Great Lakes Region:
(The Ankole Example)

Instead of talking about Rwanda and Burundi, let me talk about Ankole (Western Uganda) which had a similar social structure. What they call "ethnic" groups are in fact more akin to occupational guilds based on job specialization: agriculturists, cattle-keepers and rulers in the case of Ankole; and in the case of Rwanda-Burundi do not forget to add a fourth group – the hunter-gatherer – the Batwa (Pygmy-like). In Ankole, there were the Bahima (cattle-keepers), the Bairu (cultivators) and the Bahinda (rulers). If a Muhima lost cattle, he would become a Murasi and eventually, become a Mwiru; if a Mwiru acquired cattle, he would become a Mwambari and, eventually, become a Muhima. The society was, therefore, cyclic, around the principle of job specialization and the ideology that went with it. This was at the level of the commoners. Of course, the commoners could be absorbed in the ruling caste also. In fact the mother of Ruhinda, the founder of Bahinda dynasty, Njunaki, was a Muzaana (a female slave) possibly captured from neighbouring tribes. Since the Banyankore are patrilineal, all her offspring became members of the Bahinda caste. None of the other two castes, however, would ever become a Muhinda. Bahinda were the rulers and they monopolized political power. The Bahinda did recruit warlords from among the Bahima and Bairu depending on the talents of individuals. Ultimate power, however, resided in the Bahinda. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the Bahinda are a new dynasty going back for only 36 generations, starting around 1500. Yet the society itself is very old. What, then, were the characteristic relations in such a society? Were they parasitic relations or were they symbiotic relations?

To answer whether the relations among the Banyankore society were symbiotic or parasitic, apart from the knowledge of history in our possession, we need to go to language and capture the words that characterized the exchange of goods and services between the specialized groups and within them. The cattle-keepers' exchange of products with the cultivators was called okuchurika (barter-trade). This specifically meant exchange of foodstuffs (especially millet and bananas for cattle-keepers did not eat most of the other goods) and perfumeries (ebibaya, orweju, etc.) If it were other items like pottery (engyemeko, rukome, enyabya, ebichuba, etc.), milk-pots (ebyanzi, enkongooro), wooden watering buckets (amachuba), wooden bowls (entatika), iron items (amachumu, emihoro, empango, ruraara, orumwaiso, enyerere, etc.), or copper items (emiringa), another word would be used - okubunzya (hawking). Okubunzya would result in okugura (purchase). If it was beer, whether of bananas (amaarwa or rwaagwa) or millet/sorghum (omulamba), the term of exchange was okushengyeera. If beer was not sold but just given in form of a party, it was called okutereka. If, on the other hand, beer or other food items were sent as gifts, it was called okuzinduka. If, on the other hand, meat was sent as a gift, it was called okutsiira. All these and more were terms of exchange or gifts among equals within the specialized groups or between them. All these words conclusively prove that, between the common Bahima and common Bairu (i.e. those not elevated by the rulers to position of warlords), the relations were symbiotic without any doubt. While the relations in exchange of goods and services were completely symbiotic and on equal basis, there would, sometimes, be mutual deprecations between these two groups in terms of attitudes. This, however, did not affect the equality of the two in terms of exchange.

Our rich language, determined not to leave any shadow of doubt, provides completely different words for exchange between the commoners (Bahima/Bairu) and the rulers (Bahinda/Bashambo or the commoners they elevated to position of warlords). The categories of rulers were precisely described by our language: Omugabe (the king); Enganzi (Prime Minister); Omukuru w'omutwe (regimental/commander); Omwinginya/Omurangira (prince); Omwigarire (queen); Rubuga (official sister and co-ruler); Omumbaija (any other sister of the king); Nyamashore (the queen-mother) etc. The terms of exchange between the commoners and any of these categories were very different from those applying among commoners. Here, one begins hearing of Okutoija (pay tribute). Tribute itself is called emitoijo. It is clear that there is no exchange here. The recipient may or may not reciprocate. If he reciprocates, it would be called okugaba (donate). The king may okunyaga (confiscate) a commoner's property because he is not happy with him. He may also kunogora the cattle of the commoner (partial confiscation). He may also kutangisa (to fine) etc. The relations between the ruled and the rulers were clearly parasitic or, at least, hegemonic.

Therefore, any progressive force seeking reform would have noted the symbiotic relations with satisfaction and would have concentrated on eliminating the parasitic relations: okunyaga, okunogora and okutoija. However, you all have been hearing that there are conflicts between the cattle-keepers and the cultivators in the Great Lakes Areas: Bairu-Bahima, Bahutu-Batutsi, etc. Where these conflicts are, it is not in search of social justice; but as a consequence of a colonial manipulation and ideological bankruptcy by the local political elite. If you look into the past, any progressive polarization of social interests, where parasitic relations still persisted, would have seen the common Bahima and common Bairu forming a common front to resist the parasitism of Bahinda/Bashambo and the commoners they would have elevated to state positions (Enganzi, warlords etc.).

All this, however, was before colonization. With the onset of colonialism, completely new relations came into force. In Ankole the British introduced Nvuma laws (inviolability of property rights) in 1905 in order to punish the Ankole chiefs for killing Galt, the British PC for Western Province. In Rwanda, the obuhakye (clientship) was abolished in the late colonial period by Mwami Rudahigwa. The Buhakye was also abolished in Burundi. The money economy was introduced and selling and buying became the main forms of exchange. People took up paid employment. The main problem remained underdevelopment of the economies as a whole. In particular limited employment opportunities.

However, the colonialists introduced a new imbalance: manning the colonial administration at the low levels. Here, following false genetic and cultural arguments, they would decide to use elements (very limited in numbers) from one of the specialized groups in running the colonial administration. They would, for instance, say that the Tutsi in Rwanda or the Baganda in Uganda are "naturally clever" and, therefore, are good for administration. They would, then, say that the Acholis, the Kurias, the Kambas or the Bangala are "brave naturally" and they should dominate the Army or Police. Of course, the numbers involved were very small. By the 1950s, the Ankole area had a population of 5,000,000 persons and it had about 275 senior and minor chiefs. Even if one assumed that all of them were from one "ethnic" group, how would such a category of people bring marked advantages to the "ethnic" group? The salary of the

minor chiefs would be about Shs. 80 (about $10 at that time). When you hear the reactionary politicians creating such havoc in search of "balancing", they are seeking to balance such miserable figures. After independence, of course, the number of state employees increased. The Public Service of Uganda today (army, civil service, teaching service, etc.) is only 300,000. Uganda, currently with a population of 20 million, will all the same not have its employment problems solved by such miserable figures.

Uganda has now been independent for more than 36 years. During 22 of those years, our country was led by elements from the North of Uganda who proceeded to fill the army, the police, the intelligence services, etc., with personnel from that part of the country. Recently, I asked opinion leaders from that part of our country to show me the "development results" of that "domination" of these services by elements from the North. There were none. Whatever signs of development that there were, were a consequence of private investment by the locals, many of whom have never worked for the Government.

Key issues in Conflict Resolution:

Therefore, when we talk of conflict resolution, we must address four issues:

(a) Ideology as opposed to obscurantism and criminal opportunism;

(b) The strategic goals of our countries in development terms;

(c) Empowerment of the people to ensure inclusion; and

(d) Mechanisms of handling conflicts where they arise.

First, we must reject the sectarian ideology of reactionaries, which, as we have seen above, is based on false history and foreign manipulation. We should only work with people who believe in Burundi, in Rwanda, in Uganda and in Africa and not with those who believe in sectarianism. The latter must be isolated and suppressed. Sectarianism is nothing but criminal opportunism, seeking cheap popularity and utilizing dangerous techniques.

Secondly, it will be easier to suppress the reactionaries if we are clear about the long-term goals (strategic) of our countries. Will our countries remain backward, pre-industrial societies based on primitive agriculture, exporting a few raw materials with a preponderant import-orientation? With such underdevelopment, we shall have plenty of opportunity to fight over "balancing" of jobs in the bureaucracy; even that will cause the absorption of a small number of people. If, on the other hand, we do not accept this, then we shall have to take the road that has saved the countries of Europe from stagnation and deprivation. By 1810, the population of U.K. was only 10 million people. A man, by the name of Alfred Malthus, was so alarmed that, mourning the disappearance of plagues and pestilences that had kept the population low in previous millennia, he warned that unless people engaged in abstinence, the population which was growing "geometrically" could not keep pace with food production which was only growing "arithmetically". The population of U.K. is

now, not 10 but 56 million and it is more opulent than ever before. What made the difference?

Industrialization. This is the way forward for our countries. Holland has only got a land area of 41,000 sq kms but with a population of 16 million people with a lot of affluence. Rwanda and Burundi are actually bigger than Holland in land area by an area of 10,000 sq kms with less population. Many of them are, however, living in poverty. With industrialization, many of the labour force will get jobs provided we equip them with skills.

Thirdly, to avoid conflict, we must ensure that the people achieve sovereignty in their respective countries and that there is inclusion in the political process. Although I have said that employment in the public service is not important, inclusion in the political process is very vital. Every major group should feel represented in Government. Inclusion in the political process means recognition of people's rights. Human beings do not only need food. "Man does not live by bread alone", said Jesus. Man needs spirituality, needs dignity. Moreover, participating in the political process enables one to influence decisions about development strategies. There must, therefore, be fair, transparent and democratic practices in the whole of Africa. Although we had elections in 1962 in Uganda, they were massively rigged in spite of the presence of the British. Constituencies were gerrymandered; instead of using a single ballot box and a single ballot paper, each political party would have its own ballot box, enabling the Uganda Peoples' Congress party of Obote to pour acid in the box of the Democratic Party; or switch labels from a full box to an empty one; or somebody could stuff additional illegal papers into a favoured ballot box; the counting would not be done immediately after polling and the boxes would be transferred all the way to district headquarters, thereby allowing for the tampering with the votes, etc. The whole process was completely discredited.

By 1966, even this non-transparent process was "abrogated" by Obote. We were supposed to have had the next elections by 1967. The elections were postponed because of the "exceptional" situation in the country, etc. As a consequence, the people of Uganda never saw the inside of a polling booth for another 18 years (1962-1980). In 1980, instead of learning from the mistakes of 1966, Obote wove new schemes. Obote and Muwanga refused to amend the Electoral Law. The non-transparency and the unfairness of 1962 were resurrected and we were back to square one. How could conflict be avoided in this case?

Finally, there should be mechanisms of conflict resolution in each country and in the region. Within each country a culture of sharing in the security fields by all nationals of the country so that the security organs are trusted by everybody; and, where necessary, sharing in the power. In Uganda, we stopped the colonial practice of recruiting army only from certain areas. We gave each district, not each ethnic group, a quota to fill in recruiting into the army. The Army, which used to be perceived as sectarian, is now perceived as national. Besides, since 1986, we have been operating a broad-based administration in politics.

As a consequence, although Uganda's problems are not eliminated, we have been able to sustain an average rate of growth of GDP of 6 per cent for the last

11 years. Uganda would have performed even better if we had a better regional security framework. We have been able to repair important aspects of our economy and social programmes in spite of the insecurity that has been endemic on our borders with the Sudan, Rwanda, Congo and Kenya at different times in the last 12 years. There should be a regional pact, not to allow insecurity to emanate from any of our countries in order to affect the neighbours. Additionally, there should be a regional arrangement to prevent the usurpation of the sovereignty of the people of East and Central Africa by despotic regimes. If, for instance, Obote had been prevented from overthrowing the 1966 Constitution or Amin's coup had been suppressed in 1971, Ugandans would have been saved a lot of haemorrhage and the economy would have been saved.

Having seen the four factors above, necessary for conflict resolution in most situations, we should know that for the Great Lakes region there are additional factors. You cannot talk of resolving conflicts in the Great Lakes areas i.e. especially in Rwanda and Burundi without talking of impunity. The first massacres took place in 1959 under the supervision of the Belgians. The international community did nothing about this. The Hutu reactionaries, therefore, came to believe that genocide could pay. On the other hand, the reactionaries in Burundi, after the nationalist movement's leadership had been decapitated through the assassinations of Rwagasore and Ngendanduumwe, the Tutsi came to believe that in order to survive Rwanda-type genocide they would have to pre-empt Hutu schemes of genocide with their own genocide. It is this permutation of criminal mishandling that has resulted in the subsequent conflicts and catastrophes in Rwanda and Burundi. Therefore, to bring this conflict to an end, anybody guilty of genocide, especially in the role of an author of genocide, must be punished by hanging.

Those who say that they no longer believe in capital punishment must not forget that the crimes committed were capital compounded. This is one area where the Law of Moses would help us: "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth". If the United Nations does not do this, the Rwanda and Burundi Governments do not do it, then the families of the victims will have their own revenge. We are, therefore, talking of disciplined punishment as opposed to anarchical punishment; punishment, however, must be there. As far as the majority of the people who were used in the genocide are concerned, other ranges of punishments must be thought about. I am tempted to recollect the traditional blood settlement in Ankole known as okukaraba which involved both paying a heavy fine of cattle and a religious ceremony to cleanse this crime.

In resolving this conflict, we must remember to rely on credible people that have not tainted themselves in the murky history of the respective countries. Our experience showed that to try to rely on a tainted person to solve such controversial problems is to indefinitely postpor the solution.

May I end by reiterating that it is incorrect to lump all conflicts together. Some conflicts are justified and principled while others are unjustified and unprincipled. As far as principled conflicts are concerned I can think of two situations:

(a) Defranchised majority, having exhausted all peaceful means, being forced to take up arms as a means of last resort;

(b) A minority group being threatened with extermination by any force whether majority or otherwise. Such a group has got every right to defend itself even by force of arms in order to ensure survival.

May I recapitulate by saying that the conflicts in the pre-colonial times were in the form of raids for cattle and women; succession wars where there was no mechanism for a smooth process; conflicts resulting from migrations of peoples; conflicts caused by the slave trade or the initial encroachment of Europeans; and, later on, wars of resistance to colonialism. Towards the end of the colonial era, there were wars of national liberation; conflicts resulting from colonial manipulations, as in Rwanda and Burundi; and anti-dictatorship wars as in Uganda, Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, etc.

The current crisis of the Great Lakes region:

At the very beginning of this presentation you remember that I cited four factors that are at the heart of the Great Lakes region's crisis. These are: the genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo; the extrajudicial mass murders in Uganda started by Idi Amin and continued subsequently; terrorism sponsored by the Islamic regime of the Sudan which has now linked up with genociders and the mass murderers; and absence of democratic governance and state structures to guarantee such governance (e.g. army, judiciary, etc.).

In the subsequent narration, centred on our involvement of the last 30 years, you will see how the four factors I have outlined above have interacted with one another to produce the Great lakes region's crisis as it is known today.

Since 1971, FRELIMO of Mozambique had been helping us in fighting Idi Amin through the clandestine recruitment of young boys; we took them to either Tanzania or the liberated areas of Mozambique for training.

Between 1976 and 1978, I, as a member of FRONASA (the Front for National Salvation of Uganda), was responsible for preparing one of such batches of trainees at Montepuez in Mozambique. In the process of gathering that particular group in Nairobi, three young boys were sent to me from Uganda by one of my comrades, Kahinda Otafiire. One of the young boys, Fred Rwigyema (R.I.P.) alias Gisa was, as it turned out, a Rwandese refugee whose family had been in Uganda since 1959, being part of the diaspora that had been generated by the first Belgian genocide in Rwanda in 1959.

This particular group that I trained in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, comprised twenty-eight fighters. Needless to state our eternal gratitude to FRELIMO and late President Samora Machel.

The Montepuez group helped me in creating a force of 9,000 fighters (by April 1979) that took part alongside our Tanzanian brothers (who put in a force of 45,000 officers and men) in expelling Idi Amin and his criminal army from Uganda.

After the ousting of Amin, Uganda had an interim period of two years of political confusion and, eventually, the rigged elections of 1980. We, as

revolutionaries, could not accept another round of rigging elections. This had been the failure of the constitutional dispensation of the 1960s. We launched our second war of liberation, this time on our own without external support being primary; different from the first anti-Amin war.

Starting with 27 rifles, we eventually built up a force of 20,000 rifles, mainly captured from our opponents in the Obote regime. We, however, got a modest contribution of 900 rifles from President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Towards the end of 1985, we got a sizeable contribution of 5,000 rifles from Mwalimu Nyerere, just before he retired. We had repaired our earlier misunderstandings with Mwalimu by this time.

By January 1986, the National Resistance Movement took control of State power in Uganda. In the 16 years since the seizure of power by Idi Amin in 1971, 800,000 Ugandans had died in extrajudicial murders.

By absorbing the myriad of security forces of the previous armies, militiamen plus fresh recruitment, we built our force to 100,000 officers and men in order to try to cope with the unstable situation in our area (Sudan, Mobutu's Congo, and others).

In our new army, in addition to Fred Rwigyema, the young Rwandese boy of 1976 (by that time a Major General in our Army), there were about 4,000 other officers and men of Rwandese origin - either part of the diaspora of 1959 or earlier immigrants that had started coming to Uganda since 1910, mainly due to harsh Belgian rule or simply in search of economic opportunities. In addition to Rwandese of the diaspora and the Rwandese of Rwandese culture that had been incorporated in Uganda, as there were Rwandese of Ugandan culture (Nkole-Kiga), that had been put in Rwanda by the colonial boundaries. However, the Ugandans of Rwandese culture did not participate in the fighting that developed in Rwanda, later. Four thousand soldiers of Rwandese origin in the National Resistance Army of Uganda started organizing under Fred Rwigyema. They told me of their intention to regain their rights in Rwanda, which had been nullified ever since the 1959 genocide. I rendered some modest financial assistance to these Rwandese soldiers but on condition that they exhausted political and diplomatic channels such as: petitioning the United Nations Organization, the Organization of African Unity, the neighbouring countries and others, before resorting to a military struggle.

In October 1990, however, these Rwandese soldiers, without prior consultation, escaped en masse and invaded Rwanda while I was here in the United States of America, attending the United Nations Conference on the Year of the Child. I immediately contacted the late president Habyarimana of Rwanda and offered to assist him in restoring peace in Rwanda, provided he also agreed to have a dialogue with the Rwandese in the diaspora leading to a national agreement to eliminate the consequences of the genocide of 1959.

Numerous efforts were made to realize a dialogue between late President Habyarimana and the Rwandese in the diaspora in Mwanza, Arusha, Kyanika and others but there was no political will to conclude this problem. The war continued. Faced with this fait accompli situation by our Rwandese brothers,

who had invaded Rwanda without consultation, Uganda decided on a two-course action.

1. To help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) materially, so that they are not defeated because that would have been detrimental to the people of Rwanda and would not have been good for Uganda's stability.

2. To encourage the dialogue between President Habyarimana and the Rwandese in the diaspora.

Unfortunately, the agreement, even when it was signed in Arusha, was not implemented. The fighting went on until the demise of President Habyarimana, the collapse of the Habyarimana Government and the genocide of about 1 million people.

After the defeat of the extremist reactionaries, about 1 million Rwandese refugees fled to Goma in Zaire (now Congo). Along with them, went the whole former army of Rwanda (FAR) and the criminal Hutu militias that had killed people in Rwanda known as the Interahamwe. The late President Mobutu Ssese Sseko decided to keep these criminals right at the border, contrary to the United Nations regulations, thereby posing a permanent danger to the population of Rwanda. Uganda and Rwanda called for the separation of armed elements from the non-combatants, to no avail. This set the stage for events that I will narrate later involving Congo-Kinshasa, then Zaire.

However, let me go back a bit to recollect my interaction with H.E. Laurent Kabila. Soon after our victory of 1986, Mr. Kabila came to see me in Entebbe. This was the first time for me to meet him. He was coming out of Tanzania where he had, apparently, lived. While in Tanzania, during the anti-Amin struggle, I had heard of Mr. Kabila, having some bases in the eastern mountains of Congo, around Kalemie, but I had never met him. He was introduced to me by the late Mwalimu J. Nyerere. Mr. Kabila wanted me to give him arms to fight Mobutu.

I told him that Uganda would not allow him to start operations on the Uganda-Congo border, given the prejudice that existed in the region against us having come to power through a protracted peoples' struggle. Some of the leaders thought that we were a bad example and that we would influence their own people. In any case, at that time, the late President Mobutu had not yet given us cause to want to fight him. It is true, he was mismanaging Congo but it was not our duty to solve internal problems of other countries. Besides, we did not want to intensify that prejudice against us by the older political leaders of Africa. I, therefore, just gave him a modest sum of money to help with political mobilization.

When, however, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) captured power in Kigali, in 1994, Mr. Kabila returned to Uganda. By this time, the Interahamwe menace had emerged on the Rwanda border with Congo. I, therefore, advised Mr. Kabila to work with the Rwandese because they had a sharper quarrel with President Mobutu than ourselves, the fact that Mobutu was by now in active collaboration with the Sudanese against us notwithstanding.

There was another Congolese who had contacts with me, by the name of Kissasse Ngandu (the late) whom I also referred to our Rwandese brothers. My aides forwarded both Mr. Kabila and Mr. Kissasse to the Rwandese Vice-President, Major General Kagame.

Apparently, Major General Kagame tasked the two brothers to recruit a force of Zairois (Congolese) to be trained by the Rwandese and be kept as a standby force to be used in case President Mobutu unleashed the Interahamwe criminals on the people of Rwanda for another round of genocide.

According to later information, Mr. Kabila and Mr. Kissasse did not succeed in raising the necessary manpower. When I later met Major General Kagame, he informed me of his frustrations. Then, an idea occurred to me. I had heard that 40,000 Masisi Tutsis of Congo's Kivu province had been hunted out of their ancestral land by the Interahamwe and President Mobutu's gangs and had taken refuge in Rwanda.

I, then, suggested to Major General Kagame to recruit a force of about 1,200 soldiers from among the Masisi people, train them and make them part of the Rwanda Patriotic army, in order to keep them as a standby force. Major General Kagame like the idea. In fact, thereafter, I forgot all about it but Vice-President Kagame went ahead and operationalized the idea.

Meanwhile, the stalemate of the Interahamwe criminals and the masses whom they had stampeded across the border persisted and grew worse. Having carried out the genocide against the innocent people in Rwanda, the Interahamwe now wanted to do the same in Kivu Province of Congo actively supported by Mobutu's administration. They had already uprooted the Masisi Tutsis as already pointed out. They now headed for another group known as the Banyamulenge, around Uvira. This must have been around August 1996 or thereabout. The next time I met Major General Kagame, he informed me that he had, actually, trained a group of 2,000 rather than the 1,200 we had talked about. He now sought my opinion regarding how they could be utilized in view of all the chaos in the Great Lakes region.

I then suggested to Vice-President Kagame that it would be better for us to contact Mwalimu Nyerere (R.I.P.) on the issue in order to avoid the isolation we had experienced from the other African countries during the Rwandese conflict. Vice-President Kagame concurred with me and I, accordingly, contacted the late Mwalimu Nyerere and briefed him about the force of 2,000 and the threat to the Banyamulenge. He informed me that he would invite the European Union ambassadors to enlist their support. He duly called them but, of course, they must have filed reports to their headquarters and that was that, since the danger of genocide to the Banyamulenge persisted. It was at that stage, that the Rwandese brothers decided to send in the force of 2,000 to defend the Banyamulenge and, later on, help in dismantling the camps of the criminals in the Bukavu and Goma areas. Apparently, they recruited another 2,000 fighters from among the Banyamulenge Tutsis, other Congolese of Rwandese culture and other Congolese tribes. The Rwandese can tell the story better at this stage.

However, according to what the Rwandese told me, it is this force of 4,000 that defended the hills of Mulenge, liberated Uvira, Bukavu and Goma. As these towns were falling, the Rwandese informed me that they had now brought four

groups of Congolese together: the 4,000 or so Congolese fighters of Rwandese culture, Mr. Kabila, Mr. Kissasse and another gentleman of the Bashi tribe known as Masasu (in prison). This is how the word "Alliance" came to be used in designating their organization; it was the "Alliance" of the four or so groups. At this stage, through fraternal contacts, a number of African countries like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zambia and uganda gave material support. Angola, even contributed troops, and Tanzania later gave the "Alliance" training personnel.

Congo having been a hunting ground for profits for so many external interests, there was intensive pressure to influence events as the struggle proceeded. We tried our best to galvanize African opinion. I remember in the early days of that conflict I briefed Their Excellencies: Mandela, Mugabe and Chissano in South Africa about this Congo situation which they had not known much about. Progressive African opinion was galvanized. In particular, I knew that the position of H.E. Mandela was very important. The major danger to Congolese liberation, ever since the days of Lumumba, had been external anti-democratic involvement.

In recent times, some European circles had assumed the vanguard role of frustrating the peoples' aspirations. It was clear to me that there were only four deterrents to such Europeans' negative involvement:

(a) They feared a protracted peoples' struggle, Viet Nam style, if the Congolese could organize it; the Congolese had, however, failed once before in the 1964-1966 Congo war in spite of considerable solidarity from Africa and the Communist bloc;

(b) They would be cautious of American wishes - in this case the Americans wanted Mobutu to go but they did not favour Mr. Kabila; they wanted a third force;

(c) To some extent they feared the manifest unpopularity of Mobutu. However, the popularity, or otherwise, of Mobutu's regime had never been a major factor in Congo ever since the days of Lumumba; Lumumba had been the most popular politician but he had been deposed and, then, killed with impunity; and

(d) These external forces feared going against South Africa because of the rather hi-tech weapons that South Africa commanded; these European circles knew that if African freedom fighters got those weapons, and progressive Africa was unanimous, the battlefield would be levelled unlike in the past when it was never level.

I shared all these views with the comrades that were involved including H.E. Kabila and H.E. Kagame. I was, therefore, most surprised when H.E. Kabila refused to go to H.E. Mandela's ship in the Atlantic, citing security reasons. This worried me and I invited him to Uganda. We had discussions for hours on this one subject and, then, parted. To my amazement, he refused to return the second time.

Fortunately, for the struggle, events were moving fast. After the Banyamulenge had captured Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, assisted by troops of the

Rwandan Army, a massive recruitment of fighters from other Congolese tribes started. As the training proceeded, the fighting continued, being executed, mainly, by the Rwandan Army, the Banyamulenge and commanded by a young officer, by the name of James Kabareebe of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA). Apparently, that young officer had been recruited and trained in Uganda by the Tanzania training team that had been assisting us in Jinja. As time went on, more and more Congolese fighters from tribes other than the Banyamulenge joined the fight after the training. I was, however, worried about the direct involvement of the Rwandese troops in the combat role. I preferred that they only remain in a training role. In fact at one point, I almost succeeded in getting H.E. Kagame to withdraw them. However, H.E. Kabila resisted this; a move I did not like because, even in our own experience in 1978/79, I did not support the involvement of Tanzanian troops in the combat role in Uganda beyond the retaliation against Amin's invasion of the Kagera salient. I had wanted us to fight for ourselves. When we supported RPF, we never allowed our troops to play a direct combat role except in limited retaliatory strikes against Habyarimana's army for indiscriminate shelling of civilian hamlets and villages. This has always been our position on the Sudan except in March-April 1997, when we were forced to take decisive action against the Sudanese Army because of the criminal terrorist attacks on civilians in Northern Uganda, West Nile and also Rwenzori mountains going through Mobutu's Congo. We also destroyed the Sudanese Army in Western Equatoria because they were directly threatening the Rwandese troops in Congo and the Congolese freedom fighters from their bases in Kaaya, Baazi, Morobo and others. Again, this was limited; not aimed at installing Dr. Garang in power, in the Sudan.

I feared two situations in using outside troops, even the fraternal ones:

(a) It artificially distorts the outcome of the conflicts; one gets artificial "winners" and "losers"; the political problems, therefore, remain unresolved because the "winners" "win" artificially and the "losers", "lose" artificially. This could, however, be compensated for, if the artificial "winners" brought in all the legitimate, political forces so that they all plan for the future, together. If, however, one combines a scenario of "artificial winners" and political exclusion, one is setting a stage for future political problems. Furthermore, since somebody is relying on external support primarily, he neglects internal, political integration. He neglects making the necessary compromise internally because he is relying on external support to muffle internal fissures.

(b) The internal liberation forces do not build capacity. However, my opinion was not accepted, especially by H.E. Kabila. Incidentally, this used to be one of the differences between Obote and myself during the anti-Amin struggle.

Furthermore, from the little I could gather, the lack of structures and lack of broad representation in the "Alliance" was worrying. Since this was quite a big war involving regional troops, I was of the opinion that a national conference of all anti-Mobutu political forces should have been organized into an ultimate body that would select the future Government of Congo instead of leaving it to the "Alliance", whose internal mechanisms of decision-making were not known to us. My fear was that any future complications in Congo would be

blamed on the regional leaders that, without doubt, decisively and quickly, tilted the balance of forces in favour of H.E. Kabila and the "Alliance".

Therefore, just before the fall of Kinshasa, I suggested the idea of holding a national conference of all anti-Mobutu political forces, to H.E. Bizimungu, H.E. Mkapa, Mwalimu Nyerere and H.E. Kagame. The majority of them, however, thought it was a "bit late" and that we should remain "close" to H.E. Kabila "advising" him and so on. I was, however, not interested in the role of "adviser" to H.E. Kabila because the few times I had tried to "advise" him, he appeared to resent my advice. He only "advised" me to get involved in the internal affairs of Congo, on his side when I preferred not to be; but he resented the "few pieces of advice" that I proffered to him as "interference in his internal affairs".

From that time, Uganda's only involvement in Congo was to send a police training team following the decision of the Harare Breakfast Group, to train the Congolese in riot control.

It did not take long for my fears to be borne out. The victory against Mobutu by the Rwandese and the Congolese they had mobilized was realized by May 1997. However, by 1998, murmurings had started coming out of Congo that Kabila was no different from Mobutu. I shared my fears with the African leaders I met in a seminar in Namibia in July 1998. However, by the 2nd of August, mutinies broke out all over Congo. The Congo crisis had broken out afresh.

Our original reasons for supporting Kabila against Mobutu had never been addressed: the genocidal Interahamwe, the terrorists supported by Sudan through Congo and the threat of genocide to certain sections of the Congolese population in Eastern Congo. An accountable government in Congo would also be a factor for stability because unlike Mobutu's government, such a government would be answerable to the people. Therefore, such a government could not easily get involved in foreign adventures.

With this outbreak of new fighting in Kabila's own forces, given all the unresolved issues that closely and dangerously impinged on the security of our country and the neighbouring countries and communities, we decided to make precautionary deployments in Eastern Congo, so that the Sudanese do not use that area to create havoc in Uganda as they had done in November, 1996, when we defeated a large force sent by the Sudanese through Eastern Congo to capture the Kasese region of Uganda as a bridgehead for further Sudanese-Congolese invasion of Uganda. It did not take long before the Sudanese and "Amin" soldiers entered Northern Congo. Thanks to our presence, we defeated these forces. This denied the terrorists who had been infiltrated in the Rwenzori Mountains of Uganda fresh supplies. These terrorists had been committing untold atrocities against the population of Uganda as you can see from the file of newspaper cuttings that I have circulated to the esteemed members of the Security Council.

Apart from our own security interests, we cannot countenance again genocide in Rwanda, Burundi or Eastern Congo. This should, really, be the responsibility of the Security Council. However, when it comes to Africa, the United Nations never rises to the occasion. If the regional countries do not act where they can, irreversible tragedies will occur in our region again. This, we cannot

support. There are those who vulgarize the concept of sovereignty. To some circles sovereignty also includes the right to exterminate part of your people because they are "yours". People do not belong to leaders! They belong to their families, to their countries and to God. Any regime, which sets out to exterminate part of its people, loses legitimacy. I am a Ugandan, I, however, cooperated with Tanzanian troops to get rid of Idi Amin. You remember, at that time, there were those clamouring that by fighting the criminal regime of Idi Amin we were violating the "Sovereignty" of Uganda. How could Amin epitomize the sovereignty of Uganda? The sovereignty of Uganda had for long been usurped by the dictators to the detriment of the Ugandan people. By getting rid of Idi Amin, taking advantage of regional troops from Tanzania, the people of Uganda, eventually, regained their sovereignty.

Coming to the specific situation of Congo, therefore, there are four issues: disbanding the genocidal forces from Rwanda and Burundi; disbanding the terrorists supported by Sudan using Congo territory; stopping the genocide in Eastern Congo which had started; and, if possible, the emergence of an accountable government for Congo. I say, "if possible", because it is not our duty to democratize Congo. However, democratic neighbours always assist peace in the region.

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31 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the following statement on Croatia issued on 24 January 2000 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union (copies attached in English and French).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) António MONTEIRO
Permanent Representative of Portugal
to the United Nations

00-27031 (E) 310100 310100

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Annex

(Original: English/French)

Statement dated 24 January 2000 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Croatia

Recent parliamentary elections in Croatia, and the democratic way they were conducted, have opened a new phase in Croatian politics. The European Union welcomes this development and looks forward to the presidential elections and to the formation of the new Government.

Against this background, the Council has decided to rapidly put into place the Joint European Union-Croatia Consultative Task Force, in order to start preparing the ground for future contractual relations, within the framework of the "Stabilisation and Association Process". It has also decided, as a first step towards an intensified political dialogue, to extend an invitation to the Croatian Prime Minister designate to the General Affairs Council of 14 February.

The Council is encouraged by the positive meeting President Prodi had in Zagreb on 14 January with the new leadership as well as with the acting President. The Council welcomes the Commission's intention of upgrading its representation to Zagreb as well as of sending a fact-finding mission next month, mandated to assess the needs and establish the priorities with a view to enhancing Community assistance. As soon as conditions allow it, a feasibility study on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement could be envisaged.

With a view to the perspective of Croatian integration in the European structures, the European Union expects the new Government to meet the well-known conditions necessary for a closer relationship between Croatia and the European Union: namely progress on constitutional, electoral, media and judicial reform, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic reform, active progress on Croatia's obligations under the Dayton/Paris Agreement (including refugee return and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and a full commitment to regional cooperation. In this context the European Union puts special emphasis on the importance of Croatia's active commitment to the principles and objectives of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

The European Union looks forward to working with the new Government in Croatia in order to achieve early progress on these issues and is ready to help it meet the challenges it faces in developing a closer relationship with the European Union.

The Council expresses the hope that the recent developments in Croatia will be an example soon to be followed throughout the region and will mark the beginning of a fruitful and constructive cooperation between the European Union and Croatia.

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LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On 10 January 2000, the Security Council convened an open meeting (4087th) to consider the item entitled "The situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa". As a result of the discussion held during the meeting and following further consultations on this question, the members of the Council recognized the negative impact of AIDS on peace and security on the continent and worldwide and considered that it is high time for the United Nations to elaborate a comprehensive and effective agenda for action against the epidemic of HIV/AIDS. In this connection, the members of the Security Council suggest that the General Assembly may wish to review the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects and to consider proposing new strategies, methods, practical activities and specific measures to strengthen international cooperation in addressing this problem.

(Signed) Richard C. HOLBROOKE
President of the Security Council

00-27305 (E) 010200

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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31 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

As you are aware, the Security Council held an open meeting on 10 January 2000 (4087th meeting) to discuss the impact of HIV/AIDS on peace and security in Africa. The Vice-President of the United States chaired the meeting, and the Secretary-General, the President of the World Bank, the Director of UNAIDS and the Administrator of UNDP addressed the Council. The themes of the meeting included the impact of HIV/AIDS on peacekeeping and on the development and stability of nations, especially in Africa. I attach a copy of the verbatim record for your information.*

Following the meeting, the Council received a letter dated 21 January 2000 from the Director of UNAIDS outlining the follow-up actions UNAIDS plans to take to combat and control the spread of HIV/AIDS, as well as UNAIDS plans to coordinate with the Security Council.

Members of the Security Council requested that I inform you of the 10 January open meeting of the Council, and of the Council's desire to explore the possibility of further cooperative action with the Economic and Social Council. I have requested that the members of the Security Council who will take over the presidency in the coming months stay in contact with you on this important issue.

(Signed) Richard C. HOLBROOKE
President of the Security Council

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* See S/PV.4087 and S/PV.4087 (Resumption 1).

00-27299 (E) 010200

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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31 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the statement of Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the Council of Europe regarding the urgency and need for Bosnia and Herzegovina's admission to the Council (see annex). While noting that still important steps should and must be taken by various officials within Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would most heartedly agree with Mr. Klein's overriding theme that those who view the Dayton/Paris Accords as "temporary" and, in particular, those who would promote the concept of a transient Bosnia and Herzegovina are against Bosnia and Herzegovina's admission to the Council of Europe. The longer the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relevant established institutions is blocked from without, the more that will encourage forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina not to fulfil commitments for membership. In effect, those opposing the Peace Accords understand that this gives them an effective veto over Bosnia and Herzegovina's expression of statehood, sovereignty and assumption and realization of human rights and democratic norms consistent with our State's development.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

APPLICATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Statement made on 25 January 2000 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe

You have the grave responsibility to provide advice on a question of historical importance - whether to admit Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe. It is an honour to appear before you, in the spirit of cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe, to give personal testimony on this question which, in my view, is as important for the long-term future of Europe as it is for the future of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Simply stated, my argument is that the new States which have emerged from the former Yugoslavia are like orphans growing up on a religious, cultural and ideological fault line which has historically drawn European nations into intervention and conflict. The people of these fledgling States need to be inside a welcoming European home to support them in asserting democracy and practising European values. Left outside, they risk continuing to be the victims of nationalist leaders with self-interested extremist agendas - thus perpetuating the cycle of national instability, regional insecurity and necessary international intervention.

I speak from the perspective of five years' experience of international peacekeeping and peace-building in the former Yugoslavia. I am a citizen of the United States of America, a country that opened its doors to my mother and myself after the Second World War - a country that, over the past 200 years, has taken in the world's refugees seeking political, economic and religious freedom, and which has led the way in demonstrating strength from ethnic diversity.

I am also a son of Alsace, born only a few kilometres from here. I understand first hand the difficulties of a people always dealing with uncertainty about where they belong. As you are aware, this province changed nationalities six times in 350 years. An each time State borders changed, the culture, the language, the heritage and the destiny of a people came into question.

This is also the current dilemma of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For centuries it has been an area of political and religious contention between the Catholic West, the Orthodox East and the Islam of the Ottomans, overlaid in recent decades by the ideology of oppressive centralization and communism. During the war, it was also a tragic battleground between the ideals of the Englightenment and the dark forces of chauvinism.

The positive legacy of history is encapsulated in the ethnic map in 1991 which shows a patchwork quilt of creeds and customs testifying to the ability of the people to live, work, marry and bring up their families in tolerance.

Sarajevo, where the main Orthodox church, Catholic cathedral, Islamic mosque and Jewish synagogue are within a few hundred metres of each other, was the jewel in the crown.

The ethnic map of today is the result of the crimes of ethnic cleansing between 1992 and 1995 when over 250,000 people were killed and half the population - 2.2 million people - were forcibly displaced. It shows a multi-ethnic State with largely mono-ethnic regions and entities that are economically non-viable and inherently unstable - unless they are regulated by European values and institutions.

The tragedy of the war is that, in an economically depressed environment, dressed in flags of extremism, corrupting history for political purposes and appealing to nationalist myths that never actually happened, politicians unleashed the darkest forces of human nature. These forces are not unique to the people of the Balkans - few States have a history without aberrations.

But when aberrations do occur, and through misjudgement or lack of will we find ourselves temporarily powerless in the face of evil, the challenge is not just to defeat the enemy but to construct a future that will give the best chance for peace, justice and human dignity to prevail.

Dayton was an historic achievement. It ended the fighting through negotiation not capitulation. The price of this negotiated peace was that a protectorate could not be imposed even though, with hindsight, a protectorate of limited duration may have been the most effective and quickest way to implement peace and bring war criminals to justice.

Instead, the Dayton architecture deployed an overwhelming military presence in and around Bosnia, whose purpose was to contain and restrain. The underlying assumption was that outside Powers would ensure that the war does not break out again while internal forces, with international reconstruction assistance, would mend the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new central institutions would be used to re-establish the organic linkages of everyday life that bring diverse cultures and traditions to work together in a single State.

Nearly five years later, we see more clearly two impediments to these assumptions. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina was never an independent State - for 600 years the decisions which affected it were made in someone else's court, be it Istanbul, Vienna or Belgrade. In other words, it always functioned within a larger geo-political construct.

Thus the first challenge is to actually build a State identity. But what is the Bosnian State? Is it the reconstruction of pre-war Sarajevo? Is Bosnia the State of Bosniacs with lesser status for other peoples? Is it a series of ethnic protectorates extending from neighbouring States with Croats looking to Zagreb, Serbs to Serbia, Bosniacs to the Middle East and other minorities left in limbo?

These are the seminal questions which accession to the Council of Europe would lay to rest. Accession would promote State identity through a sense of belonging to a common value system based on respect for individual freedoms,

rule of law and participatory government. It would enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to be confident in its relations with its neighbours and to fulfil its promise of being the most multi-ethnic democratic country in the Balkans.

The second major impediment which Dayton could not address was the continued domination of the political process by wartime leaders and recently enriched elites. And regrettably, even the envisaged mechanisms for apprehending war criminals were not implemented with vigour.

These elites profit from weak and ineffective central institutions. Wartime underground networks to evade the sanctions regime have been turned into politico-criminal networks involved in massive smuggling, tax evasion, trafficking in women and stolen cars. Veterans groups run illegal markets and use the profits to hinder the establishment of effective multi-ethnic police forces. Some politicians play the nationalist card to mask their lack of commitment to developing State institutions. Public accountability and personal responsibility are notoriously absent.

Fortunately, these nationalist elites do not represent the aspirations of ordinary citizens whose life experience has been shaped by influences consistent with the mainstream European heritage. It should not be forgotten that, before 1991, the ordinary citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were used to good educational standards, the highest material standard of living in the "communist" system, and had the long experience of coexistence under Tito's concept of "brotherhood and unity".

The political ethos of ordinary people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is thus far more pragmatic and tolerant than the rhetoric of the nationalist elites would acknowledge. We should remember that the people are the political centre of gravity. Indeed, had it not been for Slobodan Milosevic and his associates, the former Yugoslavia would have been among the very first candidates for full integration into Europe. A full decade has been wasted, with only tragedy and tears to show for it.

But we cannot allow ourselves to be captives of the past. Despite fierce obstruction and interference from neighbouring States, with the assistance of the international community the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have put their energy into building a better future.

Real progress has been made. The country is functional. There is full freedom of movement, infrastructure has been rebuilt, there is a fully functioning common currency, common documents (soon to be supplemented by a single passport), offensive symbols are being removed from public institutions, important facilitating laws, such as on property, have been harmonized and are being implemented.

The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which is charged with police restructuring and reform and judicial assessment, is playing its part in the establishment of the rule of law. In 1995 there were 40,000 wartime police. There are now 20,000, organized on a civilian basis. All of them have undergone human rights and transition training to make them fully aware of the standards required for a truly democratic police force. Our focus

is now on specialized training to bring them up to the most modern international standards.

Two police academies have been fully established to train multi-ethnic police cadets in European policing standards. Graduates are assigned to areas where their presence gives confidence to minority ethnic groups, thus underpinning further minority returns. This year we have initiated a major programme of exchanges of experienced police officers who are themselves displaced persons or refugees.

The fact that minority returns are taking place to locations that were inconceivable a few years ago, such as Ahmici, Prijedor and Drvar, and that displaced persons are conducting assessment visits of their homes in such places as Srebrenica and Foca, is a testament to growing confidence in rule of law institutions.

The laws on internal affairs have been redrafted to be in accordance with European standards. Police officers who violate human rights are regularly investigated and dismissed. More remarkable is that recently two senior police officers were successfully investigated by the internal police disciplinary commission for corruption and were fired - an inconceivable scenario just a short time ago. And the judiciary has begun to tackle even the most politically sensitive cases such as corruption, inter-ethnic violence and the illegal occupation of houses.

In Brcko, the fully integrated multi-ethnic district police force was inaugurated last week. New laws on the police and the judiciary now codify human rights protections and standards in line with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

For the first time, we have the beginnings of a genuine Bosnia and Herzegovina State Border Service which is a fundamental element of State sovereignty. Personally, I was not surprised that some elements of the present leadership opposed it - the uncontrolled border is probably the greatest revenue source for criminal elements and hard-line nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the end of this month, the first fully regulated border entry point in Sarajevo will be opened, to be quickly followed by three major land crossing border posts.

In support of common institutions and national identity, multi-ethnic police officers have been trained to form the first Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations civilian police contingent, which will be deployed in East Timor next month. This is to be followed this year by a contingent of United Nations military observers and, eventually, a logistics and engineering company serving under the United Nations flag.

I am the first to say that much more needs to be achieved for peace implementation to be self-sustaining. But it is irreversible, and the best way to make it self-sustaining is to engage now, from the inside. To refuse is to reward those who oppose Bosnian State sovereignty and independence and who still harbour fantasies of separatism.

Moreover, we are now at a moment in the wider region that offers real hope for further progress. As long as ultra-nationalist regimes ruled in Zagreb and Belgrade, everything that we did in Bosnia and Herzegovina was problematic. The people of Croatia have at last voted for democracy and economic progress. In doing so, they have sent the strongest message to the Herzegovinian hard-liners - the delusions of partition must end. And my hope is that Croatia will now become part of the solution and not continue to be one of the problems.

I urge you to take advantage of these winds of change. The Council of Europe is in a unique position to reinforce the message to all remaining obstructionists and hard-liners: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multi-ethnic State with permanent borders, it is an accepted part of Europe, and it is on the right path to be eventually welcomed into the European Union.

Every morning in Sarajevo I pass the queues of young people in front of Embassies applying for visas because they do not see a future for themselves or for Bosnia. They fear being trapped or marginalized from mainstream western development in some Balkan no-man's land fought over and preyed upon by nationalist, extremist and criminal interests. They too need to hear your message. Who will remain to build a stable and prosperous future if the talented young generation departs?

Moreover, I fear that if Europe does not come now to Bosnia, then Bosnia will eventually come to Europe, but it may not be a Bosnia you wish to see sharing your home or even living in your neighbourhood.

Events in Kosovo last year showed yet again that the Balkans have a way of requiring European "attention" in one form or another with relative frequency. The hope is that the new European security architecture and the Stability Pact can prevent such violent and costly eruptions. A Bosnia and Herzegovina which is part of the European family of nations is necessarily at the centre of such a preventive policy. But it will remain a place which can be ruptured at any time by malevolent nationalist forces unless it has the protection of belonging to a greater whole.

I recognize that the arguments for and against immediate accession are finely balanced. Wise judgement must be made.

On the one hand, as I have said publicly in Bosnia, no one wants to invite into his house a quarrelling family or to accept, as an equal, a State whose politicians want only to break it up into principalities where they can reign supreme in their own interests.

On the other, it is my considered assessment that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina need your assistance to bury the ghosts of the past and take up their rightful place in the European community of nations.

Left outside for too long, one of your closest neighbours may become a breeding ground for anti-democratic and foreign tendencies sustained by exploitation and criminality. There are viruses that are just as unhealthy for Europe as any armed enemy. They have the potential to destabilize and harm the

building of a new Europe in a much more insidious and dangerous way than any armed belligerent.

Four years ago, I argued strongly against the immediate accession of Croatia into the Council of Europe. I did so because I considered that Croatia's place as part of Europe was certain. Therefore, it could be held to stringent conditions before being admitted to the Council.

Today, I argue equally strongly in favour of giving Bosnia and Herzegovina an easier path to accession. I do so because its ultimate socio-political orientation is not yet certain. It deserves special attention. Its future is in your hands.

In this brief post-war period, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been unable, by their own efforts, to seize their destiny and assert their rights. They are on the right track but they need your assistance to gain their freedom - not through the imposition of an extensive list of strict conditions, which the nationalist "kleptocracy" will always ensure are never met, but through acceptance and inclusion. I assure you that there are separatists, obstructionists and extremists who will ensure that any preconditions set will never be met.

By all means, throw down the challenge - identify one test case, one piece of key legislation or one central institution, that must be implemented. Demand that the leadership declares itself - not with broken promises as it did with the Border Service legislation, but with action. If the leadership again fails then move on.

It has been argued that to allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to accede to the Council of Europe before all the conditions are met is to show weakness in the face of obstruction and to give improved electoral prospects to nationalist leaders and parties. I would be the first to oppose any measures that constitute appeasement or giving in to extremists.

But this is an area where strict Cartesian logic cannot always be followed. To allow obstruction to prevail is to reward and empower entrenched interests. It demonstrates that they are being successful in their obstructionist tactics, that they are powerful and that they deserve electoral support.

By contrast, to reach over their obstruction by allowing immediate accession is to marginalize them. It shows to the people that these leaders are powerless to stop progress. They are yesterday's leaders and should be discarded at the polls. As the Balkan proverb says: the dogs bark, but the caravan continues to move on.

I trust the ordinary people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have faith in their good sense. They must be the epicentre of our focus. Access to European institutions and regulations will empower them. It will furnish not only the intrusive scrutiny of European institutions but also the instruments of redress that are essential to weaken and eventually remove the exploitative power of nationalist elites.

Without the benefit of such scrutiny and access to these instruments, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to be pulled in directions which could undermine the security of Europe as a whole.

The most effective way to prevent such an outcome is to allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to be an integral part of the European family of nations. While it is clear that it still has a distance to go in fully meeting European standards, to deny accession again would only reward those who caused its misfortunes.

The dramatic change in Zagreb, the expansion of the European Union, and the strategic position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the vision for a strong Europe argues for accession to be given now.

Europe has a choice - to wait and hope that this orphan on an historical fault line will somehow grow by itself into a fully European State, or to seize the initiative, give Bosnia and Herzegovina an anchor and a home in Europe, and work with purpose and perseverance to bring it into full conformity with the laws and regulations of the Council of Europe. I firmly believe that Europe is strong enough to rise to this challenge.

If we in the international community demonstrate the lack of a clear agenda, we send a message of doubt and uncertainty to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are saying: continue to play along on the surface and wait until either the international community does engage forcefully, or until international attention fades away.

I urge you, do not fall prey to political fatigue, compassion fatigue or donor fatigue. Demonstrate a clear agenda to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who look to your support. Give them hope, give them a home in Europe, make their entry into the Council of Europe the first accession of the new millennium. If you do so, when the history of this period is written, historians will judge that what you did was just and that it was right.

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LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the English translation of a note verbale, dated 25 November 1999, addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the abduction of four Iranian border guards by Iraqi forces (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hadi NEJAD-HOSSEINIAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-27320 (E) 010200

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Annex

Note verbale dated 25 November 1999 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran and has the honour to state that according to the report received from the border officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, following the recent infiltration into Iranian territory (in the Shalamcha border area, the kilometre Bisto Panj Sentry Post) of an armed group composed of terrorist elements belonging to the MKO based in Iraq, four Iranian border guards were dispatched to the border at point zero in the above-mentioned area, on 25 November 1999 at 0500 hours, with a view to controlling and preventing further infiltration and illegal movement across the border. They were abducted by the Iraqi forces and taken to the Iraqi Al-Deir base (near Basra). The identities of the border guards abducted are:

1. Sergeant Hojatt-ullah Nezam Ul-Islami, son of Ahmad, born in 1346 Solar Hijra, birth certificate No. 8 issued in Borrojerd.

2. Corporal First Class Fazlullah Joodaki, son of Sabzali, born in 1355 Solar Hijra, birth certificate No. 1096 issued in Khoram-Abad.

3. Corporal Mohammad Feizi, son of Yaddolah, born in 1355 Solar Hijra, birth certificate No. 450 issued in Bakhtarani.

4. Conscript Reza Kakavand, son of Mohammad, born in 1358 Solar Hijra, birth certificate No. 1238 issued in Ahvaz.

While protesting strongly against the abduction of the Iranian border guards by the Iraqi forces, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran holds the Iraqi Government responsible for the consequences of breaching its border obligations and good-neighbourly principles as well as harbouring the MKO on its soil and creating appropriate conditions for it to organize terrorist, sabotage and armed activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and emphatically demands the immediate release of the Iranian abducted personnel.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity to convey to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran the assurances of its highest consideration.

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LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the English translation of a note verbale, dated 9 November 1999, addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning infiltration into Iranian territory by an Iraqi armed group (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hadi NEJAD-HOSSEINIAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-27314 (E) 010200

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Annex

Note verbale dated 9 November 1999 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to state the following:

According to the reports received from the relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 9 November 1999 at 0200 hours, 18 armed Iraqi bandits infiltrated the border of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Chazaba area (Iranian Safaria Sentry Post) and, after having tied up the Iranian local tribesmen, stole their cattle. Following the clash between the border guards of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the armed Iraqi bandits, they fled to the Iraqi interior leaving behind the cattle.

This is to recall that infiltration by armed Iraqi bandits into Iranian territory and harassment of the Iranian tribesmen settled in the Hoor Al-Azim area are not unprecedented. On 17 September 1999, 33 fishing boats, belonging to the Iranian tribesmen living in the same area, were stolen by the same type of armed Iraqi bandits.

While protesting against the acts of infiltration and illegal entry into Iranian territory committed by the Iraqi armed group, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran holds the Iraqi Government responsible for the consequences of the above-mentioned armed acts resulting from its failure to take precautionary measures and live up to its bilateral and international obligations, and emphatically expects the Iraqi Government to adopt appropriate measures aimed at restoring security in the area and preventing recurrence of such acts in the future.

Obviously, the border police of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based in the area, aware of the sensitivity of the existing border issues and of the need for restoring security in the area, takes necessary steps to this effect.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity to convey to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran the assurances of its highest consideration.

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LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement issued on 27 January 2000 by the Presidency of the European Union on Guinea-Bissau (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Antonio MONTEIRO
Permanent Representative of Portugal
to the United Nations

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on Guinea-Bissau issued on 27 January 2000 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union

The European Union welcomes the return of constitutional and democratic order to Guinea-Bissau through the holding of free and fair legislative and presidential elections whose results are the expression of the will of its people. The European Union appeals to all parties in Guinea-Bissau to abide by those results and to cooperate among themselves in order to consolidate peace, national reconciliation and economic development.

The European Union congratulates the newly democratically elected institutions of government of the country and strongly encourages them to act in a spirit of tolerance, in order to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights for the benefit and prosperity of the people of Guinea-Bissau.

The European Union reiterates that, under such conditions, it is ready to cooperate with the new authorities and to continue to support Guinea-Bissau in its reconstruction and rehabilitation programme.

The European Union commends the work carried out by the Government of National Unity as well as that of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau for the promotion of the pacification and democratization process in Guinea-Bissau.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, and the EFTA countries members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this statement.

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 31 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to forward the attached letter from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, regarding the Security Council's recent deliberations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for circulation to the members of the Security Council and for distribution as a document of the Council.

00-27287 (E) 010200

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Annex

Letter dated 31 January 2000 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the Security Council's recent deliberations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to recall the presidential statement issued by the Council on 26 January 2000 (S/PRST/2000/2).

The South African Government has consistently supported the efforts of the Southern African Development Community, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a process that culminated in the signing in Lusaka of a Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July 1999 (S/1999/815).

My Government is appreciative of the Council's recent efforts to support and strengthen the implementation of the Agreement, by inviting the Heads of State of the parties to New York to recommit themselves to the Agreement.

Their common resolve to adhere to and implement the Agreement, and the Security Council's commitment, contained in the presidential statement of 26 January 2000 (S/PRST/2000/2), to begin consideration of a resolution authorizing the expansion of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) along the lines recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 17 January 2000 (S/2000/30), are welcome developments.

Pursuant to the above, the South African Government has the honour to request that the Security Council urgently adopt the draft resolution referred to in the presidential statement, with particular attention being paid to the following general principles:

- Security Council resolutions authorizing United Nations deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo must be wholly based on the Lusaka Agreement of 10 July 1999 (S/1999/815).

- States and non-State parties involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo must equally demonstrate their commitment to the Lusaka Agreement.

- It is important for the national dialogue to take place in an environment which is acceptable to the parties, and which guarantees the participants' security.

- No conditionalities should be attached to the deployment of MONUC, such as linkage to the need for "progress" in the national dialogue.

- MONUC/JMC and associated personnel should enjoy the necessary security and freedom of movement to effectively implement the Lusaka Agreement.

- MONUC/JMC must coordinate closely, including sharing location and support structures, to ensure that both operate in a mutually supportive manner towards the achievement of shared goals agreed to in chapters VII, VIII and IX of the Lusaka Agreement.

- The Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of MONUC phase II should, in addition, reaffirm the commitment of the Security Council to begin preparations for a phase III deployment, under a Chapter VII mandate.

- Lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be achieved without the disarmament of all armed groups. Relevant Security Council resolutions which provide for the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement must contain a mandate for effective disarmament under Chapter VII of the Charter. This will create the necessary conditions allowing for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nkosazana DLAMINI-ZUMA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of South Africa

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/82
2 February 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a note verbale dated 15 November 1999 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Embassy of Iraq in Tehran (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hadi NEJAD HOSSEINIAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 15 November 1999 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Embassy of Iraq in Tehran

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presets its compliments to the Embassy of Iraq in Tehran and has the honour to state that, according to the reports received from the relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a number of Iraqi fishing boats, carrying armed individuals in civilian attire, have intercepted, over this recent period of time, Iranian commercial launches to Kuwait along the route taken by them and have embarked on the threatening and looting of these launches.

While protesting against such attacks, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran holds the Government of Iraq responsible for these acts, and therefore expects that the latter, with a view to contributing to the safety and security of international maritime navigation and preventing the recurrence of these incidents, will instruct the Iraqi fishers and armed forces accordingly and inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Legal Affairs General Directorate) of the result.

Obviously, the measures adopted to this end will contribute effectively to the process of normalization of the relations between the two countries.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/83
3 February 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2000 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 864 (1993) CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, which was adopted by the Committee under the no-objection procedure on 2 February 2000, and is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

(Signed) Robert R. FOWLER
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 864 (1993)
concerning the situation in Angola

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Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present annual report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola covers the period from January to December 1999.

2. A report of the Committee covering its activities from January to December 1998 was submitted to the Security Council on 28 December 1998 (S/1998/1227).

3. For 1999, the bureau consisted of Robert R. Fowler (Canada) as Chairman, with the delegations of Argentina and Malaysia providing the two Vice-Chairmen.

4. The Committee held five meetings and several informal meetings in 1999.

II. SUMMARY OF THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

5. In accordance with a decision taken by the Committee at its 15th meeting, on 20 January 1999, a note verbale was sent to Member States on 27 January 1999 requesting information from those States that had not yet replied on measures taken in compliance with resolutions 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998). Replies were received from 13 States; these were issued as documents of the Committee (S/AC.31/1999/1-13).

6. At the meeting held on 20 January, the Committee endorsed the proposed visits of the Chairman to Angola and other countries to assess implementation of the measures imposed against UNITA and to seek ways to enhance the implementation of those measures. The Council in its resolution 1237 (1999) of 7 May 1999 also endorsed those visits.

7. On 12 February 1999, as requested in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1221 (1999) of 12 January, the Committee submitted a report to the Council (S/1999/147), containing recommendations by the Secretary-General and proposals by the Committee for improving the implementation of the measures imposed against UNITA. Those measures included the commissioning of expert studies to trace violations in arms trafficking, oil supplies, the diamond trade and movement of UNITA funds. Among the steps recommended was the possible imposition of sanctions in the area of telecommunications. In this connection, the Chairman of the Committee wrote on 26 January 1999 to the Director General and Chief Executive Officer of INTELSAT and to the Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union seeking their advice and information on the feasibility of implementing that recommendation and the steps that could be taken to that end.

8. On 19 February and 7 July 1999, notes verbales transmitting addenda to the list of senior officials of UNITA and adult members of their immediate families whose travel had been restricted in accordance with paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 1127 (1997) were sent to all States, international organizations and specialized agencies. This list is to be updated by the Committee on a regular basis and any additions or deletions are to be transmitted accordingly.

9. At its 16th meeting, on 23 March 1999, the Committee considered communications from Angola and Zambia concerning alleged violations of the sanctions imposed against UNITA. The commissioning of expert studies was also discussed (see below).

10. In May 1999, the Chairman visited seven African countries (Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). On 4 June the Chairman submitted a report to the Security Council (S/1999/644) on the results of his visits, with recommendations for enhancing the implementation of the measures imposed against UNITA. In July, the Chairman visited Algeria, Belgium, France, Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A report on those visits containing further recommendations for better implementation of the measures imposed against UNITA was submitted to the Council on 28 July (S/1999/829). The Chairman also briefed the members of the Council at its 4027th meeting, on 29 July.

11. On 9 July 1999, in his statement to the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its seventieth ordinary session, held at Algiers, the Chairman outlined the following objectives of the Committee in the discharge of its mandate:

(a) First, to engage Governments and the private sector in discussions to identify measures to improve the effectiveness of Council-imposed sanctions against UNITA;

(b) Second, to remind Governments of their obligation, under the Charter of the United Nations, to implement Security Council resolutions and to encourage them to enact the necessary legislation or regulations to that end;

(c) Third, to request Member States, companies and individuals to provide the Committee with information on violations of Council-imposed sanctions against UNITA.

12. The Council of Ministers of OAU adopted a decision on Angola in which, inter alia, it appealed to all Member States to strenuously work for the implementation of all Security Council resolutions especially those relating to sanctions against UNITA (see A/54/424, CM/Dec.450 (LXX)).

13. On the margin of the OAU session, the Chairman also met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Swaziland in his capacity as Chairman of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Inter-State Defence and Security Committee to discuss efforts by SADC to develop information-sharing arrangements on sanctions violations and to assist its members in implementing the Security Council sanctions against UNITA.

14. On 16 July 1999, the Chairman met with the Secretary-General of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). During that meeting, it was agreed that Interpol would bring the issue of the Angolan sanctions to the attention of the Southern Africa Police Chiefs Organization during an upcoming meeting. To this end, the Chairman also forwarded to him a set of Security Council resolutions concerning measures imposed against UNITA to be distributed to the members of the Southern Africa Police Chiefs Organization.

15. During his visit to Brussels in July 1999, the Chairman met with representatives of the World Customs Organization to discuss the opportunities for collaboration specifically with regard to improving customs procedures relating to items covered by the Security Council measures against UNITA, including diamonds. The Chairman also met with representatives of the European Commission to discuss opportunities for collaboration, and addressed a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Forum.

16. In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1173 (1998), the Committee is authorized to approve, on a case-by-case basis, exemptions to the measures specified in paragraphs 11 and 12 of that resolution for verified medical and humanitarian purposes. In this connection, the Committee approved on 20 July 1999, on a no-objection basis, a request from the Government of South Africa for an exemption on humanitarian grounds to the measure specified in paragraph 12 (a) of the resolution.

17. During his visits to Africa and Europe in June and July 1999, the Chairman took the opportunity to meet with the senior management of De Beers in South Africa and London to enlist the support and assistance of the diamond industry in abiding by the decision of the Security Council that imposed measures against the illicit trade in diamonds by UNITA. On 5 October, De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited addressed a letter (see S/1999/1048) to the Chairman outlining further action taken by De Beers, notably the decision to "suspend buying anywhere in the world any parcels of Angolan diamonds".

18. Following a meeting between a representative of the Chairman and representatives of the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA) in Antwerp on 7 November 1999, IDMA issued a press release (see S/1999/1163) calling for zero-tolerance within the diamond industry of violations of the sanctions against UNITA and reaffirming that it would continue to work closely with the United Nations and the expert panel to achieve greater compliance with the imposed sanctions regime.

19. Also during the Chairman's visit to Europe in July 1999, the authorities of Ukraine offered to submit to the Committee information on the results of their investigations into specific alleged violations of the sanctions against UNITA. That information was subsequently provided to the Chairman of the Committee in a letter dated 11 December 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations.

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPERT PANELS

20. In accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1221 (1999), the Committee submitted to the Council on 12 February 1999 its report (S/1999/147) on enhancing the implementation of the measures imposed on UNITA, which included the commissioning of expert studies to trace, inter alia, violations in arms trafficking, oil supplies, the diamond trade and movement of UNITA funds. The commissioning of the expert studies was initially recommended by the Secretary-General (see S/1999/49). The Council endorsed that recommendation in its resolution 1229 (1999) of 26 February 1999.

21. On 4 May 1999, the Chairman submitted to the Council a conceptual framework for the expert studies (S/1999/509). On 7 May, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1237 (1999) by which it, inter alia, established expert panels for those studies for a period of six months and specified their mandate. The Council also requested the Chairman of the Committee to submit to it an interim report of the expert panels by 31 July 1999 and a final report with recommendations within six months of their formation.

22. The Council endorsed the recommendation contained in the conceptual framework that the expert panels be supported as an expense of the Organization and through a United Nations trust fund established for that purpose, requested the Secretary-General to take necessary steps towards that end and urged States to make voluntary contributions to the trust fund.

23. The appointment of 10 experts for the panels was approved by the Committee, under the no-objection procedure, on 30 July 1999, and on the same day the Chairman of the Committee transmitted a list to the Security Council (S/1999/837). For practical reasons, it was subsequently decided that the two original panels would function as one. The panel's membership was brought up to full strength when, following the withdrawal of one candidate, a tenth expert was recruited in October 1999 (see S/1999/837/Add.1).

24. The panel held two full meetings in New York in August and Geneva in September 1999 and formulated a plan of work, which it is now executing, with a deadline of February 2000. On 30 September, the Expert Panel established by Security Council resolution 1237 (1999) submitted its interim report (S/1999/1016) pursuant to that resolution.

25. At the 17th, 18th and 19th meetings, on 15 September, 15 November and 30 December 1999, the Chairman of the Expert Panel, Anders Mollander, briefed the Committee on the Panel's work, including visits to Washington, Moscow and Lisbon (the troika countries), regional and subregional organizations, and other countries in Africa and Europe. At the 17th meeting, the members of the Committee agreed that Ambassador Mollander would serve as the spokesman for the Panel and that they should be briefed by the Panel once a month where possible in view of travel by Panel members, and whenever important developments might warrant such a briefing.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

26. Public awareness of the sanctions increased substantially in 1999 and the effectiveness of the measures appears to have been enhanced. The work of the Expert Panel in identifying the sources and methods of violations of the sanctions and in offering practical recommendations for further action stands to render the sanctions still more effective and thus further impair the ability of UNITA to pursue its objectives through military means.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/84
3 February 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 FEBRUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the delegation of religious leaders from Kosovo comprising Dr. Rexhep Bojaj, Mufti and President, Islamic Community of Kosovo; Mr. Qemajl Morina, Vice-Dean, Faculty of Islamic Studies; H.E. Artenije Radosavljevic, Bishop of Raska-Prizren, Serbian Orthodox Church, Father Justin (Milan) Jezdic, Msgr. Marko Sopi, Bishop, Diocese of Prizren, and Don Shan Zefi, Vicar General, Diocese of Prizren; will be visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina from 7 to 9 February 2000 on a mission of peace and reconciliation at the invitation of the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During their visit, the religious leaders of Kosovo will have working meetings with the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina to consider the situation in, and possible solutions to the issue of, Kosovo. The early fruit of the work of the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina in promoting tolerance and reconciliation in our country is hoped to have a similar impact also in Kosovo.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-27773 (E) 030200

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/85
4 February 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 3 FEBRUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States and British aircraft based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey continued between 24 and 31 January 2000 and that the aircraft in question engaged in acts of aggression, reconnaissance activities and acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the United States, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the facilities for these acts of aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

These actions are continuing to bring death and injury to hundreds of civilians and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The logistic support that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey provide to the United States and British forces makes them key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they share international responsibility for the consequences of these actions. The Government of the Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek lawful compensation for the damage being inflicted on its people by these same actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations by United States and British aircraft and damage caused, 24-31 January 2000

1. In the northern region 54 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1120 hours on 24 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out eight missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Aqrah, Dohuk, Baibo, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1140 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1132 hours on 25 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 10 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Aqrah, Dohuk, Dukan, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1335 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1118 hours on 30 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 20 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Aqrah, Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah and Tall Afar areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1350 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1050 hours on 31 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Aqrah, Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah, Tall Afar, Rawanduz and Irbil areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1415 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 166 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1940 hours on 24 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 30 missions, 18 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 12 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an EC-2 command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Ushbayiah, Amarah

Diwaniyah, Qal'at Sukkar and Nukhayib South areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2100 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1454 hours on 25 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 56 missions, 30 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 26 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an EC-2 command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Basrah, Najaf, Shinafiyah, Artawi, Busayyah, Salman, Nukhayib and Samawah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1705 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 0850 hours on 27 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 54 missions, 34 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 20 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an EC-2 command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Ushbayjah, Lasaf, Basrah, Qurnah, Samawah, Amarah, Qal'at Sukkar, Nasiriyah, Salman, Jalibah, Shatrah, Taqtaqanah South and Nukhayib South areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1010 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 0645 hours on 29 January 2000 United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 12 missions from Saudi territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Ushbayjah, Lasaf, Nukhayib and Ar'ar areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0815 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 0705 hours on 30 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 14 missions from Saudi territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Ushbayjah, Lasaf, Nukhayib, Ar'ar and Salman areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0930 hours, drove them off.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/86
4 February 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 FEBRUARY 2000 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have been instructed by my Government to bring to your attention yet another series of heinous terrorist acts committed by ethnic Albanian terrorist separatists in Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia:

1. On 2 February 2000, an anti-tank rocket hit a bus of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the road between Kosovska Mitrovica and Banja with 49 passengers, all of them Serbs. Two passengers were killed, three severely wounded, while 20 passengers were taken to the French base hospital.

2. On 3 February 2000, a bomb was thrown into a cafe in Kosovska Mitrovica. Twelve Serbs were wounded.

The most recent terrorist acts of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), transformed into the so-called Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), have caused the justified anger of the Serbian population in Kosovska Mitrovica and throughout the province and provide tragic evidence that KFOR and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) have done nothing to disarm the KLA and ensure protection to all residents of Kosovo and Metohija, their basic obligations under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999. These acts of ruthless terrorism are also an outright consequence of the establishment of the KPC, whereafter attacks on Serbs and other non-Albanians have escalated.

The fact that the terrorist attacks were carried out on the UNHCR bus filled with Serbs while escorted by KFOR, and on the cafe in Kosovska Mitrovica in which the presence of KFOR is very extensive, is of particular concern. It shows that, even after eight months since its deployment, KFOR is unable to carry out its basic obligation under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) to ensure a secure environment for all residents of Kosovo and Metohija.

The failure of KFOR and UNMIK to provide protection is a disgrace and, along with the fact that the bus ferried Serbs alone - which was to be known

only to UNHCR, KFOR and UNMIK - raises serious questions as to their credibility, as well as their responsibility for the attacks.

The circumstances of these tragic incidents prove once again that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been right in warning that KFOR and UNMIK lack the resolve and readiness to guarantee freedom of movement and security to all. Such an attitude has resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Montenegrins, Goranci, Turks and other non-Albanians: over 350,000 of them have been expelled or forced to leave Kosovo and Metohija.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia finds the confused, languid and vague reaction of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the perfidious attack on the UNHCR bus unacceptable. It does not condemn the rampant terrorism which is a direct consequence of the agreement his Special Representative has made with ethnic Albanian terrorist separatists on the transformation of the KLA into the KPC.

In reminding the Security Council that its failure to seriously confront the continued exacerbation of the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija in outright disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other non-Albanians, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia takes the opportunity to warn once again that such an attitude will bring about an escalation of terrorism throughout the region. It will result in a destabilization of the Balkans and South-East Europe, for which the Security Council will be solely responsible.

In bringing these terrorist acts to your attention, I convey herewith the request of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened to consider them.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/87
4 February 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 4 FEBRUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement issued on 25 January 2000 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Republic of the Congo (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Antonio MONTEIRO
Permanent Representative of Portugal
to the United Nations

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement issued on 25 January 2000 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Republic of the Congo

The European Union took note of the agreements signed by representatives of the Army and the Militias, respectively in Pointe Noire on 16 November 1999 and in Brazzaville on 29 December 1999, and welcomes the appointment of President Bongo of Gabon as mediator for an all-inclusive dialogue.

Both of those agreements represent significant steps forward on the path towards pacification and national reconciliation in the Republic of Congo, whose people are still suffering the effects of a prolonged and disruptive armed conflict.

The European Union therefore calls upon all Congolese parties to renounce violence and firmly commit themselves to the opening of an all-inclusive national dialogue in order to:

Reach a comprehensive and lasting end to hostilities;

Lead to full respect of human rights, the rule of law and the restoration of democracy through the holding of free and fair elections.

If progress takes shape towards establishing free, transparent and pluralistic elections, the European Union may consider assistance, beyond emergency humanitarian aid, to contribute to the restoration of peace, democracy and development in Congo-Brazzaville.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.